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  Since early 1970s, the GCC economies have made continuous efforts to reduce 
their relative dependence on the oil sector through the development of manufacturing 
and services sectors.  The scope as well as the success of these diversification efforts, 
however, varied widely across the GCC region.  For example, during the period 1990-
1997, non-oil exports account for 30% of total export proceeds in Bahrain, 18% in 
Oman and Qatar and only around 10% in the oil rich members of Kuwait, Saudi 
Arabia and United Arab Emirates.  Thus after three decades of diversification efforts, 
the contribution of oil exports in GCC economies remains quite high.  This pattern of 
dependence is further reflected on the structure of budget revenues in these countries 
with oil revenues on average accounting for 87% in Kuwait, 78% in Oman 74% in 
Saudi Arabia, and 77% in United Arab Emirates during the period 1990-1997.  
 
  This large dependence on the oil sector coupled with large degrees of openness 
explains the vulnerability of these economies to international price shocks.  Perhaps 
this vulnerability is best illustrated by the impact of the decline in oil prices during 
1998 on these economies.  Real growth rates dropped, export proceeds declined and 
budget deficits soared to a level of about US$20 billions in 1998.  
 
  Apart from the short-run fluctuations in oil prices that may be apt to 
coordination problems among the members of the OPEC cartel, the three major forces 
that may shape the oil market over the next two decades are climate change, 
competition from renewables, and technology.  The International Energy Agency 
(IEA) estimates indicate that renewable constitute 13.8% of total world primary 
energy supply in 2000 with biomass representing 80% of renewable.   In OECD the 
estimates show that the supply of new renewable (Wind, Solar, Geothermal) had 
grown by 9.4% over the period 1971-2000 and projected to grow annually by 2.7% 
over the period 2000-2030.  Yet, due to expected shifts from biomass to modern 
energy in developing countries, the total contribution of renewables to world energy 
supply is projected by IEA to drop to 12.5% in 2030.  Steady technological 
improvements  in exploration techniques are expected to stabilize oil supplies and 
bring down extraction costs.  Technological advances in fuel efficiency in developed 
countries are expected to weaken the growth of fossil fuel demand and thus along with 
the supply conditions are expected to exert a downward pressure on oil prices.   
Nonetheless, the climate change issue may prove to be the most important factor 
affecting the international demands and prices of oil as well as of other fossil fuels 
over the next 20 years.   
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2. An Overview of the Climate Change Policy Regime 
 
  Increasing risks of potentially irreversible changes in the global climate due to 
human influences have generated international responses to limit the emissions of 
anthropogenic Greenhouse Gases (GHG).  These efforts, starting with the Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) in 1992, had culminated in the Kyoto 
Agreement in 1997, which obliges developed industrial countries (Annex B) to reduce 
their GHG emission by about 5% from their 1990 levels by the time frame 2008-2012.  
The meetings of the conference parties (COP) in Bonn and Marrakech, in 2000 and 
2001 respectively, have settled on the implementation issues and thus paved the way 
for the Kyoto Protocol to enter into force.  Yet important issues and concerns to 
developing countries, such as adaptation, funding, and technology transfer remain to 
be worked out through the conference Subsidiary Bodies for Scientific and 
Technological Advice (SBSTA) and for Implementation (SBI).  To this concern, the 
November 2002 meeting of conference parties in New Delhi (COP8) had reflected 
developing countries issues such as adaptation and sustainable development without 
reaching any substantial progress on this front.  In particular, in this recent COP 
developing countries represented by the G77 group have emphasized the need for 
technology transfer and financial assistance to cope with the adverse economic effects 
of the climate change and as well the effects of the response measures to be taken by 
the developed countries to reduce their GHG emissions under the Kyoto Protocol.   
 
To enter into force, the protocol needs the ratification of 55 nations accounting 
for at least 55% of developed countries carbon dioxide emissions in 1990.  By the 
time of writing, 96 nations have ratified the protocol, yet to satisfy the 55% emissions 
requirement the ratification by Russia is a must given the withdrawal of the United 
States.  
 
3. The Economic Impacts of Response Measures 
 
  International trade links among countries will transmit effects of greenhouse-
gas control measures adopted by one set of nations to countries that may not have 
agreed to share the burden of control.  For example, emissions restrictions under the 
Kyoto Protocol will increase the cost to Annex B regions of using carbon-emitting 
fuels, thereby raising manufacturing costs of their energy-intensive goods, some of 
which may be exported to developing countries.  The restrictions also will lower 
global demand for carbon-emitting fuels, reducing their international prices.  In  
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addition, emissions control may depress economic activity in countries subject to 
emissions restrictions, lowering these countries’ demand for imports, some of which 
come from developing countries.   In combination these changes in trade volumes and 
prices can have complex consequences, harming some developing countries while 
benefiting others.  
 
  Beginning with the framework convention on climate change, the parties have 
agreed that implementation of any agreement should give special attention to the 
concerns of vulnerable economies.   Article 4.8 of the convention states: 
 
In the implementation of commitments … the parties shall give 
full consideration to what action are necessary… to meet the 
specific needs and concerns of developing country parties arising 
from adverse effects of climate change and/or the implementation 
of response measures… 
 
  Among a list of nine specific points of focus for this concern is the following:  
 
(h) Countries whose economies are highly dependent on income 
generated from the production, processing and export, 
and/or on consumption of fossil fuels and associated energy-
intensive products.  
 
Article 4.9 of the convention calls for special attention to the least developed countries 
“with regard to funding and transfer of technology”.  
 
  The Kyoto Protocol restates this obligation, using somewhat stronger 
language.  In particular its Article 2.3 holds that:  
 
The parties in Annex I (which refers with slight difference to the 
same group as Annex B) shall strive to implement policies and 
measures … in such a way as to minimize adverse effects, 
including … effects on international trade, and social, 
environmental and economic impacts on other parties, especially 
developing country parties and in particular those identified in 
Article 4, paragraphs 8 and 9 of the convention, which consist 
mainly of energy exporting and small island countries.  
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Article 3.14 goes on to call for early consideration by the parties of “what actions are 
necessary to minimize the adverse effects,” and expands the list of mechanisms to be 
considered to include “the establishment of funding, insurance and transfer of 
technology”. 
 
  The relevance of these provisions for the GCC countries is obvious.  On one 
hand, given their fragile ecosystems, the GCC countries would likely be victims of the 
adverse effects arising from climate change.  In particular climate change may add to 
existing problems of desertification, water scarcity and food production.  On the other 
hand, and most important, the GCC economies would be harmed by the 
implementation of response measures given their degree of openness and their high 
rate of dependence on the oil wealth.  
 
  The objective of this note is to provide an assessment of the magnitudes and 
mechanisms through which implementation of Annex B commitments in the Kyoto 
Protocol may affect these economies, and in view of the above provisions, how then 
these effects might be mitigated.  
 
4. The Magnitudes and Distribution of the Kyoto Burdens 
 
  The Energy Journal produced a special issue in 1999 that focused on 
quantifying the economic costs of implementing the Kyoto Protocol.  The issue 
included results from economic models that are widely used in assessing the economic 
impacts of climate change policies.  Though these models differ widely in their 
structures, assumptions and regional coverage, they agree that the burden of 
implementation will unevenly fall on energy exporting countries.  The magnitudes of 
costs on oil exporters for the emission trading case in these models are reported to 
range between 0.5% and 4% loss of GDP in 2010.  In spite of the caveats raised about 
these models, these results are indicative of the large distributional aspects of the 
Kyoto Agreement that the flexibility mechanisms and the provisions of Articles 2.3 
and 3.14 of the protocol need to be invoked to mitigate these effects.  With emissions 
trading in CO2 permits among Annex B parties, these models showed that the GDP 
loss would be reduced by about 40%.  If in addition the other greenhouse gases are 
included, Reilly et al (1999) showed that the losses would be reduced by about 60% in 
2010.  Nonetheless, these latter results may only be regarded as lower bounds since 
these models typically assume that trading and flexibility mechanisms are 
implemented in cost-effective ways whereas in reality there are various impediment 
and obstacles that preclude the efficient working of these mechanisms.   
5
 
  To explore the magnitudes and the transmission mechanism along with the 
possible ways to reduce the impacts of Annex B response measures on the GCC 
region, I report the results from Babiker et al (2000) study on Kyoto Protocol and 
developing countries.  
 
4.1 Magnitudes and Transmission Mechanism 
 
  Table (1) shows the Decomposition of the Impacts of the Kyoto Protocol in 
2010 for a non-emission trading case.  A first indication is that the losses experienced 
by the GCC region, whether in GDP or welfare terms, are higher when compared to an 
Annex B country like Japan or even when compared to the other energy exporting 
regions like Venezuela or North Africa.  The transmission mechanism through which 
such large losses take place are a fall in the international price of oil (by 15% in this 
case) and an increase in the import prices of energy-intensive goods in the GCC 
region. Thus as reflected in the table the terms of trade for this region deteriorate by 
about 9% whereas those of Annex B and other energy importers such as South Korea 
and India witness an improvement.  Yet a further channel (not included in the model) 
through which the losses experienced by GCC countries could be transmitted to other 
developing countries is expatriate remittances. The labor market statistics during the 
period 1990-1998 indicate that the expatriate labor force represents 63% for Bahrain, 
83% for Kuwait, 61% for Oman, 86% for Qatar and 65% for Saudi Arabia (Zind, 
2002). Hence the income losses inflicted by the response measures on the GCC 
countries would also be shared by some of the poorest nations in Africa and Asia.  
 
  The second feature reflected in the table is the uneven distribution of burdens 
from Kyoto with the GCC region experiencing the most costs and with leading 
developing countries such as south Korea gaining from the implementation of the 
Protocol. 
 
  The third aspect of the results indicates how misleading GNP can be as a 
measure of the burdens of an emission-control program compared to welfare. In 
particular, the relatively higher GNP losses in Annex B are mitigated by favorable 
movements in these nations’ terms of trade, whereas the relatively lower GNP losses 
for oil exporters are aggravated by the deterioration in their terms of trade.  Thus the 
high welfare loss for the GCC region is both due to a fall in income (GNP) and an 
increased cost of consumption caused by the rise in the price of the imported 
consumer goods.  
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Table (1)  Decomposition of Impacts of the Kyoto Protocol  
(2010) for Selected Regions 
 
Percentage Change with Kyoto Protocol 
 
Welfare  GNP  Terms of Trade 
Japan -0.75  -1.84  1.4 
South Korea  0.04  0.19  0.5 
India 0.29  0.55  1.1 
Venezuela -2.92  -2.56 -8.8 
GCC -3.81  -3.12  -8.7 
North Africa  -2.40  -2.77  -6.8 
Source: Babiker et al (2000).  
 
4.2 Implementation Measures to Reduce the Effects 
 
  In the spirit of the provisions in Articles 4.8 and 4.9 of the Framework 
Convention and Articles 2.3 and 3.14 of the Kyoto Protocol, Babiker et al  Study 
considered two sets of actions that Annex B countries could take to limit negative 
impacts on Non-Annex B countries.  The first is a set of policy measures that could 
accompany implementation of Annex B controls.  This set includes revision of fuel 
taxation policies, removal of coal subsidies, and trading of emission permits. The 
second set of policy measures includes actions that Annex B countries might consider 
to meet the needs of particular developing countries.  
 
4.2(a)  Revision of Fuel Taxation, Removal of Subsidies and Emission Trading 
 
  In many Annex B countries a variety of fuel taxes are in place for decades.  
Taxes on oil products are specially important and for some European countries these 
taxes represent more than 70% of the price paid by consumers.   
 
  The original justification for these taxes were many and varied, depending on 
the country.  For some, the taxes were meant to limit foreign exchange drain or 
dependence on foreign suppliers.  In other cases taxes were a source of general 
revenues or a source of funding construction and maintenance of highways.  More 
recently, relief of road congestion and reduction of urban air pollution have offered 
additional justifications.  
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  However, in the latter cases, fuel taxes may serve as highly inefficient 
mechanisms for achieving the stated objective.  If these taxes are not efficient 
responses to external effects of fuel use then they distort economic decisions and thus 
removing them may improve economic efficiency and welfare.  For example, if fuel 
taxes are meant mainly to collect revenues, then carbon permit sales or carbon taxes 
could replace this source of revenue without jeopardizing economic efficiency with 
such separate fuel taxes.  For the climate change reason, replacing fuel taxes with a 
uniform tax on the carbon content of the fuel would achieve more carbon reductions 
than levying the carbon tax on the top of the existing fuel tax for the same level of 
revenue collected.  Yet this would shift the tax burden from oil to coal, because coal 
has more carbon content, and would thus result in smaller decline in oil prices and 
smaller losses of oil exporters. 
 
  On the other hand, coal subsidies are clearly unjustifiable in any efficient 
response to the threat of climate change.  These subsidies encourage coal usage at the 
expense of oil and natural gas and are estimated by IEA to be 5.5% in 1998, primarily 
in Japan, Germany, Spain and France.  Removing these subsidies from Annex B 
nations would both reduce the implementation costs in Annex B and the adverse 
effects on developing-country energy exporters.  
 
  The provisions for flexibility mechanisms including emissions trading are 
covered by Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol, the details of which were agreed upon in 
the conference parties meeting in Marrakech (COP7).  
 
  In spite of the complexities of alternative implementation schemes that may 
prevent attainment of the cost savings of an ideal emissions trading regime (Hahn and 
Stavins, 1999), as noted before, many studies have indicated the great potential for 
cost reductions in Annex B and accordingly the reduction of losses for energy 
exporters that could be achieved through trading.  
 
  The separate and combined effects of these three policy measures on the GCC 
and the other oil exporters are shown in Table (2).  Among the three measures the 
removal of coal subsidies has very minimal effect whereas removal of existing fuel 
taxes account for almost the same welfare gain as that from an ideal emissions trading 
regime for the GCC region.  More interestingly and contrary to what might be 
expected, the separate effects of these three measures are not additive.  Indeed, for 
Venezuela and the North Africa region, the combined effect is twice the sum of the 
separate effects and for the GCC region the combined effect is about 50% higher than  
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the sum of the separate effects.  In particular, for the GCC the welfare cost is reduced 
from –3.18% to –0.55% by combining these measures together, which is mainly the 
result of reducing the collapse in the international oil price from 15% to only 2.5%.   
On the other hand (not shown in the table) none of the Annex B parties is adversely 
affected and many have achieved considerable reductions in welfare costs as a result 
of combing these three measures.  
 
  Thus combining removal of existing fuel taxes along with emissions trading in 
Annex B almost offsets the welfare costs inflicted on energy exporters by the Kyoto 
response measure without resulting in additional costs to Annex B region. 
 
 Table (2)  Reference Welfare Loss Under Kyoto Implementation and the  
Change in Loss Under Alternative Policy Measures 
 
 Venezuela  GCC  North  Africa 
Reference Welfare Loss  -2.92%  -3.81%  -2.40% 
      
Change in Welfare Loss with:          
Removal of Existing Fuel Taxes  +0.16%  +0.96%  +0.37% 
Removal of Coal Subsidies  +0.0%  +0.01%  +0.0% 
Emission Trading  +0.81%  +1.03%  +0.5% 
      
Combining the Three Measures Above  +2.47%  +3.26%  +1.80% 
Source: Babiker et al (2000).  
 
4.2(b)  Direct Measures to Reduce the Effects of the Kyoto Response Measures 
 
  The ways in which emissions constraints are implemented can substantially 
alter magnitudes and distribution of costs, yet as long as such policies lead to 
reductions in fossil fuel use, fuel exporters will experience adverse consequences.  To 
meet the needs of developing countries adversely affected by climate change or the 
response measures of Annex B, the protocol called for the establishment of a special 
fund for these purposes.  At COP7 in Marrakech the parties agreed to establish a new 
funding mechanism that includes: the special climate change fund, the adaptation 
fund, and the least developed countries fund, and a total sum of $400 million was 
pledged by developed countries to these funds.  Yet how these funds may be used to 
alleviate the effects of response measures beyond technology transfers is unclear.  
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  Babiker et al considered two options that might assist affected developing 
countries beyond the general implementation measures considered above.  These are 
tariff concessions and direct compensations. 
 
  Unfortunately, non-energy tariff concessions were found to benefit only 
developing countries with diversified economies which already are predicted to 
benefit from the implementation measures, but adversely affected economies like the 
GCC region would not benefit from these concessions due to their heavy reliance on 
the single energy export sector.  
 
  The calculation of the level of financial transfers that would be required to 
compensate losses to Non-Annex B regions, is of interest even if such a direct transfer 
mechanism is unlikely to be established.  In particular such calculations offer some 
indication of the attention that should be given to other mitigation measures including 
technology transfer.  Naturally, the amount of compensation required to “minimize” 
Kyoto effects would depend on the stringency of the emissions control measures 
taken, how the measures are implemented and other uncertain economic developments 
between now and 2010.  
 
  Babiker et al devised a financing mechanism that involved a redistribution of 
carbon permits from Annex B to Non-Annex B with the objective of meeting the 
welfare criterion stated in the transfer scenario.  The results for selected oil exporting 
countries are shown in Table (3).  
 
  With no Annex B trading in emissions permits, Table (3) indicates the 
“minimization” of adverse impacts to energy exporters in Non-Annex B region (noted 
welfare change = 0) would require an overall annual financial transfer of $27.6 billion 
in 2010.  Over half of this amount would constitute the required transfers to 
compensate the losses of the GCC region.  Alternatively, if the objective were to 
mitigate these effects but not necessarily eliminate them, the overall transfer required 
would be greatly reduced.  For example, if welfare loss for Non-Annex B were to be 
limited to 1% in 2010, the overall transfer is reduced to $14.5 billion of which $11.5 
billion to compensate the GCC region.  In contrast, the overall amount of transfer 
needed to hold the welfare change in Non-Annex B to zero with emissions trading 
among Annex B would be reduced to $20 billion of which more than 50% would 
accrue to the GCC region.  Though the level of transfer would further be reduced if all 
GHG gases were included in the trading regime, yet even just 5% of the level 
indicated above would be significantly higher than the $400 million pledged by Annex  
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B parties at Marrakech.  None the less, despite their political infeasibility, the 
maquitudes of such transfers would represent a good bargaining benchmark in the 
ongoing negotiation process. 
 
Table (3)  Financial Transfer from OECD Countries Required to  
Reduce Oil Exporters’ Welfare Losses in  
2010 to Zero, or to a Maximum of 1% 
(1995 $US billion) 
 









Indonesia 1.59  0 1.16 
Mexico 1.75  0  1.16 
Venezuela 1.97  1.29  1.44 
GCC 15.60  11.50  11.50 
North Africa  2.96  1.72  2.26 
Total (Non-Annex B)  27.6  14.5  20.0 
Source: Babiker et al (2000).  
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
  Climate change response measures may pose a real threat to the economic 
wellbeing in the GCC region.  This note has focused on aspects of implementation 
measures in Annex B and other mechanisms available under the FCCC and the Kyoto 
Protocol that may be used to mitigate the adverse effects of such response measures 
on developing countries.  Though some sort of international response to ameliorate the 
adverse effects is necessary, at least in the short run, the real challenge for GCC 
economies to cope with the climate change issue in the long run lies in their ability to 
reduce their dependence on the oil sector.  This requires continuous and sustained 
efforts to diversify their economic structures and promote new exports.  Yet the active 
role of governments to promote diversification in the GCC through export and 
investment measures would be limited by their commitment, under the WTO which 
precludes the use of export subsidies and certain investment measures.  Nevertheless, 
some of the industries in which the GCC countries have natural comparative 
advantage and whose competitiveness would be further enhanced under the climate 
change treaty are energy-intensive industries such as petrochemicals, fertilizers, steel  
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and aluminum.  Hence a viable diversification strategy in GCC countries may focus 
on these industries with the objective to compensate their loss of oil exports with 
increased exports of these products.  Yet, such a strategy itself might face problems in 
the long run when GCC would undertake some emissions reduction commitments or 
if Annex B would take possible protective measures to safeguard the competitiveness 
of its energy-intensive industry, which necessitates the continuity of the diversification 
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  The high rate of dependence of the GCC economies on the oil wealth makes 
them vulnerable to international oil-price shocks.  One of the important threats to the 
oil markets in the next two decades is seen by many observers to lie behind the 
international efforts to curb human sources of greenhouse gas emissions.  If serious 
measures to reduce emissions from such sources are implemented they would have 
significant impacts on oil exporters through their adverse effects on oil prices and 
these economies terms of trade.  Thus some sort of international as well as domestic 
responses to ameliorate such adverse effects are necessary to help these affected 
economies to cope with the climate change policy regime.  This paper discusses the 
scale of these adverse effects for the GCC economies and the possible provisions 
under the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol 
that may be invoked to mitigate these effects.  
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ﺔﻴﺑﺮﻌﻟﺍ ﻝﻭﺪﻟﺍ ﰲ ﺔﻴﻤﻨﺘﻟﺍﻭ ﺔﺌﻴﺒﻟﺍ ﺔﻴﺑﺮﻌﻟﺍ ﻝﻭﺪﻟﺍ ﰲ ﺔﻴﻤﻨﺘﻟﺍﻭ ﺔﺌﻴﺒﻟﺍ ﺔﻴﺑﺮﻌﻟﺍ ﻝﻭﺪﻟﺍ ﰲ ﺔﻴﻤﻨﺘﻟﺍﻭ ﺔﺌﻴﺒﻟﺍ ﺔﻴﺑﺮﻌﻟﺍ ﻝﻭﺪﻟﺍ ﰲ ﺔﻴﻤﻨﺘﻟﺍﻭ ﺔﺌﻴﺒﻟﺍ : : : :      








 ﺔﺿﺮﻋ ﻲﺠﻴﻠﳋﺍ ﻥﻭﺎﻌﺘﻟﺍ ﺲﻠﳎ ﺕﺎﻳﺩﺎﺼﺘﻗﺍ ﻞﻌﲡ ﺔﻴﻄﻔﻨﻟﺍ ﺓﻭﺮﺜﻟﺍ ﻰﻠﻋ ﺔﻴﻟﺎﻌﻟﺍ ﺩﺎﻤﺘﻋﻻﺍ ﺔﺟﺭﺩ ﻥﺇ
ﺔﻴﳌﺎﻌﻟﺍ ﻂﻔﻨﻟﺍ ﺭﺎﻌﺳﺃ ﺕﺎﻣﺪﺼﻟ   . ﻥﺃ ﲔﺒﻗﺍﺮﳌﺍ ﻦﻣ ﺪﻳﺪﻌﻟﺍ ﻯﺮﻳﻭ  ﻂﻔﻨﻟﺍ ﻕﺍﻮﺳﺃ ﻪﺟﺍﻮﺗ ﱵﻟﺍ ﺕﺍﺪﻳﺪﻬﺘﻟﺍ ﻢﻫﺃ ﺪﺣﺃ 
 ﺍﺫﺇ ﺚﻴﺣ ،ﺔﺌﻴﻓﺪﻟﺍ ﺕﺍﺯﺎﻏ ﺕﺎﺛﺎﻌﺒ￿ﻻ ﺔﻳﺮﺸﺒﻟﺍ ﺭﺩﺎﺼﳌﺍ ﺢﺒﻜﻟ ﺔﻴﳌﺎﻌﻟﺍ ﺩﻮﻬﳉﺍ ﺀﺍﺭﻭ ﻦﻤﻜﺗ ﲔﺘﻣﺩﺎﻘﻟﺍ ﲔﺘﺒﻘﳊﺍ ﻝﻼﺧ
 ﻱﺭﺪﺼﻣ ﻰﻠﻋ ﺔﻣﺎﻫ ﺭﺎﺛﺁ ﺎﳍ ﻥﻮﻜﻴﺳ ﻪ￿ﺈﻓ ﺭﺩﺎﺼﳌﺍ ﻩﺬﻫ ﻦﻣ ﺕﺎﺛﺎﻌﺒ￿ﻻﺍ ﺾﻴﻔﺨﺘﻟ ﺔﻣﺭﺎﺻ ﺕﺍﺀﺍﺮﺟﺇ ﻖﻴﺒﻄﺗ ﰎ ﺎﻣ
ﺄﺗ ﻝﻼﺧ ﻦﻣ ﻂﻔﻨﻟﺍ  ﻰﻠﻋﻭ ﺔﻴﳌﺎﻌﻟﺍ ﻂﻔﻨﻟﺍ ﺭﺎﻌﺳﺃ ﻰﻠﻋ ﺔﻴﺒﻠﺴﻟﺍ ﺎﲥﺍﲑﺛ ﻁﻭﺮﺷ ﺕﺎﻳﺩﺎﺼﺘﻗﻻﺍ ﻩﺬﳍ ﻱﺭﺎﺠﺘﻟﺍ ﻝﺩﺎﺒﺘﻟﺍ    .
 ﺓﺪﻋﺎﺴﻣﻭ ﺔﻴﺒﻠﺴﻟﺍ ﺕﺍﲑﺛﺄﺘﻟﺍ ﻩﺬﻫ ﻒﻴﻔﺨﺘﻟ ﻲﻠﶈﺍﻭ ﱄﻭﺪﻟﺍ ﻯﻮﺘﺴﳌﺍ ﻰﻠﻋ ﺕﺎﻴﻟﺁ ﺩﺎﳚﺇ ﻱﺭﻭﺮﻀﻟﺍ ﻦﻣ ﻪ￿ﺈﻓ ﻚﻟﺬﻟ
ﺥﺎﻨﳌﺍ ﲑﻴﻐﺗ ﺔﺳﺎﻴﺳ ﻦﻣ ﺞﺗﺎﻨﻟﺍ ﻊﺿﻮﻟﺍ ﻊﻣ ﻢﻠﻗﺄﺘﻟﺍ ﻰﻠﻋ ﺓﺮﺛﺄﺘﳌﺍ ﺕﺎﻳﺩﺎﺼﺘﻗﻻﺍ   .  ﺔﻗﺭﻮﻟﺍ ﻩﺬﻫ ﺶﻗﺎﻨﺗ ﺭﺎﻃﻹﺍ ﺍﺬﻫ ﰲﻭ
 ﻢﻣﻷﺍ ﺔﻴﻗﺎﻔﺗﺍ ﻞﻇ ﰲ ﺔﺣﺎﺘﳌﺍ ﺕﺎﻴﻟﻵﺍﻭ ﻲﺠﻴﻠﳋﺍ ﻥﻭﺎﻌﺘﻟﺍ ﺲﻠﳎ ﺕﺎﻳﺩﺎﺼﺘﻗﺍ ﻰﻠﻋ ﺔﻴﺒﻠﺴﻟﺍ ﺕﺍﲑﺛﺄﺘﻟﺍ ﻩﺬﻫ ﻢﺠﺣ
 ﺥﺎﻨﳌﺍ ﲑﻴﻐﺗ ﻝﻮﺣ ﺔﻳﺭﺎﻃﻹﺍ ﺓﺪﺤﺘﳌﺍ (FCCC) ﺭﺎﺛﻵﺍ ﻩﺬﻫ ﻞﻴﻠﻘﺘﻟ ﺎﻬﻄﻴﺸﻨﺗ ﻦﻜﳝ ﱵﻟﺍﻭ ﻮﺗﻮﻴﻛ ﻝﻮﻛﻮﺗﻭﺮﺑﻭ   .  
 
 
 
 
 
 